Representing Possibilities in Relation to Constraints and by Agents Richard Wallace & Richard J. Wallace
Representing possibilities in relation to constraints and
agents
Richard J. Wallace
Cork Constraint Computation Center
University College Cork, Cork, Ireland
email: r.wallace@4c.ucc.ie
Abstract. In thispaper we describe aframework forovercoming agent ignorance
within a setting for collaborative problem solving. As a result of privacy concerns,
agents may not reveal information that could be of use in problem solving. In this
case, under certain assumptions agents can still reason about this information in
terms of the possibilities that are consistent with what they know. This is done
using constraint-based reasoning in a framework consisting of an ordinary CSP,
which is only partly known, and a system of “shadow CSPs” that represent var-
ious forms of possibilistic knowledge. This paper proposes some properties of
good structure for this system and shows that a reasonable set of deductions used
during the solving process preserves these properties. Extensions to the basic
framework and relations to other work are also discussed.
1 Introduction
Multi-agent systems offer new opportunities for information sharing and problem solv-
ing.Atthesame time,theemergenceofsuchsystems raisesnewissues, amongthemthe
issue ofprivacy, whicharises wheneverindependentagentsneedto shareinformationin
order to solve a problem of mutual interest. Heretofore, most multi-agent systems have
operated on the assumption that agents will be open about communicating information
that they have and that might be relevant to solving a problem [5]. However, this may
not always be the case in such settings; agents may want to maintain their privacy as
much as possible while still engaging in collaborative problem solving [2].Agents may,
therefore, need to make decisions as to how much information they will reveal and how
this will affect the efﬁciency of problem solving.
Because of privacy concerns, agents may often need to operate under conditions of
partial ignorance. In such cases, even though critical information may not be known,
agents may be able to reason in terms of sets of possibilities, such as the set of possi-
ble values for a known variable. The purpose of this paper is to describe a system for
inferring information about possibilities (and actualities) during the course of problem
solving and to demonstrate its soundness.
A critical component of this system is constraint-based reasoning. Constraint satis-
faction is a proven technology that has been successfully extended to distributed artiﬁ-
cial intelligence problems [7]. The present work differs from earlier work in this ﬁeld
in that we are studyingan independent agent paradigm where agents communicate with
each other to solve a problem of mutual interest rather than solving parts of a singleproblem. In fact, in the present system each agent has its own problem, but the solu-
tions must all be mutually consistent. Because this system is based on a combination
of ideas from constraint satisfaction and standard modal logic, it supports consistency
reasoning under conditions of partial ignorance.
We have tested the efﬁcacy of our methods in a simpliﬁed situation, This is a type
of meeting-scheduling problem, where agents have pre-existing schedules, but need to
add a new meeting that all of them can attend. Elsewhere, we show that the present
approach can in fact improve problem solving efﬁciency, and can also ameliorate the
privacy/efﬁciency tradeoff [6]. We have also shown that at the same time this form of
reasoning affords new opportunities for agents to ‘invade’ each other’s privacy, which
raises new issues in this domain. As a result, these new developments may serve to put
the problem of privacy into high relief.
The next section describes the basic situation we have used to study the problem of
privacy in collaborative problem solving and gives an overview of how our agents oper-
ate. Section3 describes howpossibilities are representedwithin a constraint satisfaction
framework, and establishes some requirements for the well-formedness of the basic in-
formation structures. Section 4 states the deduction rules and shows that they support
the requirements laid out in Section 3. Section 5 describes a further extension of the
system, in which certain possibilities are associated with events that gave rise to them.
Section6 considers the systemin relationtoprevious discussionsof agent epistemology
and to other ‘non-standard’ CSP formulations. Section 7 gives conclusions.
2 A Motivating Example
2.1 The basic problem
Our thinking in this area was inspired by an experimental case study, which was based
on an agent scheduling problem. In this problem there are
￿
agents, each with its own
calendar, which consists of appointments in different cities at different times of the
week. The task is to ﬁnd a meeting time that all agents have free and which they can
attend given their existing schedules and constraints on travel time.
For purposes of analysis, we added some simpliﬁcations. We assume a ﬁxed set of
cities where meetings can be held: London, Paris, Rome, Moscow and Tbilisi. We also
restrict meeting times to be an hour in length and to start on the hour between 9 AM to
6 PM, inclusive, on any day of one week.
The basic constraints are the times (in hours) required for travel between meetings
in different cities, indicated in Fig. 1. Travel times within one region (Western Europe
or the former Eastern Bloc) are shown beside arcs connecting cities; the arc between
the two ellipses represents travel time between a city in one region and any city in the
other.
2.2 Agents and Constraint Satisfaction
This problem can be represented as a binary constraint satisfaction problem (CSP).
Loosely, this is the problem of assigning values to variables such that all of the con-
straints in the problem are satisﬁed. Each assignment is a member of a set of valuesFig.1. Time constraint graph for a meeting scheduling problem. Cities are London, Paris, Rome,
Moscow and Tbilisi. Further details in text.
associated with a particular variable, called the domain of that variable. Constraints
are relations based on Cartesian products of the domains of values associated with the
variables in the constraint. Binary CSPs are often (partly) represented as graphs, where
nodes represent variables and arcs represent the constraints between variables.
More formally, a constraint satisfaction problem can be deﬁned as a tuple,
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An important part of constraint programming, i.e. the solving of constraint satisfac-
tion problems, has been the development of algorithms that establish a degree of local
consistency among the domains of the problem. Consistency is deﬁned in general as a
guarantee that for any
￿
]
\
￿ assignments and any unassigned variable, one can assign a
value to this variable so as to satisfy any constraints among these
￿
variables. A simple
but important example is called arc consistency, where
￿
= 2. A CSP is arc consistent if
the variables are pairwise consistent, so that an assignment to variable
￿
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is consistent
with at least one value in each of the other variables that are in the scope of a constraint
involving
￿
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￿
.
Inthepresentsituation,eachagent’s ownmeetingschedulingproblemcanbeviewed
as a CSP involving 70 variables, one for each time slot. Each variable has a domain of
ﬁve values, one for each city. The problem for each agent is to add a city-value to one
of the empty slots such that its constraints are satisﬁed. Note that at the beginning of
the task each agent already has a solution to a personal meeting scheduling problem in
the form of a (preexisting) schedule. This schedule forms an important part of the task-
problem, which involves a further assignment to another one of its variables. This can
be thought of as adjusting a global constraint that speciﬁes that
￿
slots must be assigned
a city as a value, to the requirement that
￿
S
^
￿ slots must have this property. In addition,
there is a new ‘inter-problem’ constraint that this assignment be the same for all agents,
i.e. that it involves the same variable and value.2.3 Problem solving in this situation
To solve this problem, agents must communicate. This allows each agent to determine
whethera (new) solutionto its problem also satisﬁes the inter-problem constraint. Here,
we assume that communication is peer-to-peer according to the following protocol. A
singleagentproposesameetingthatis consistentwithitsownscheduletotheother
%
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agents. Each of the latter then replies to the ﬁrst agent indicating whether it accepts or
rejects the proposal. There may be a single agent that takes the role of the proposer or
this role may shift so that each agent proposes a meeting in turn (“round robin proto-
col”); but this difference is not important for the present discussion. Communication
continues until a time and place are found that is acceptable to all agents. This protocol
has the advantage that all agents can keep track of how the task is going. Variant proto-
cols such as answering a proposal with a counter-proposal are not considered here, but
can easily be accomodated in the present framework.
This problem could be solved without further elaboration by simple bookkeeping.
Sinceeachproposal isbroadcast toallotheragents,eachagent cankeeptrackofthepre-
vious proposals, so that with a ﬁnite number of variables and values, the procedure will
terminate, either with a solution or with the agents having established that no solution
exists. However, we have found that the efﬁciency of this process can be considerably
enhanced if agents store information about other agents that can be deduced from the
communications and use arc consistency processing to reduce the number of proposals
that need to be considered in each round.
Themeans of storingand using suchinformation will be describedinformally in the
rest of this section, before proceeding to a more careful description. The information
that an agent has about another agent will be referred to as the view that the ﬁrst agent
has of the second. In this view there are different kinds of information, that may include
actualmeetingsandtimesthat areopen(“openslots”). Providedtheyhavesome general
information about the situation, here, the set of possible meeting-sites and times as
well as constraints on travel times, agents can also consider each other’s schedules in
terms of acceptable possibilities for these values even if they don’t know what the other
schedules actually are.
Deductions are made on the basis of the communications. From proposals and ac-
ceptances, the agent that receives the message can deduce that the other agent has an
(actual) open slot. It can also deduce that certain meetings that might have been in the
other agent’s schedule are, in fact, not possible; otherwise, given the travel constraints,
the agent could not have proposed (accepted) a given meeting in that slot. From a rejec-
tion a simple reduction in the set of possibilities can be made that refers to the meeting
just proposed. In addition, the agent receiving this message can also deduce a disjunc-
tive set of possible causes for this rejection. Finally, if even a small number of actual
meetings are communicated, then many more possibilities can be excluded.
These deductions can then be used either to narrow down the set of acceptable
meetings that an agent can propose, or to suggest which proposals are more likely to be
effective. Most importantly, agents can avoid making proposals that they have deduced
are impossible for at least one agent. In some cases (cf. Section 5), they can also reduce
a set of possibilities until, under the usual closed-world assumptions associated with
CSPs, an actual value can be deduced.3 Representing Possibilistic Information within a CSP Framework
Our approach to carrying out the deductions just described involves combining CSP
ideas with basic concepts from modal logic. In addition to gathering actual informa-
tion about other agents’ schedules, in particular their open times, agents keep track
of possibilities in regard to meetings of other agents. This information is maintained
in CSP-like representations, where time-slots are again taken as variables. In one of
these CSPs, domain values represent meetings that another agent might have, which we
term “possible-has-meeting” values, in another the values represent meetings that that
agent might be able to attend (“possible-can-meet” values), and in the third the values
represent meetings that are possible causes for any rejections made by the other agent
(“possible-cause” values). At the beginning of a session, when an agent knows nothing
about another agent’s schedule, all values for possible-has-meeting’s and possible-can-
meet’s must be considered, since any value is possible. So both of these CSPs have ﬁve
valuespertime-slot,i.e.ﬁvepossible-has-meetingvalues,orﬁvepossible-can-meetval-
ues. At the same time, the domains of possible-cause values are all empty.
‘Possibilistic’ domain values can be given straightforward interpretations in CSP
terms. Possible-has-meeting and possible-cause values represent possible existing as-
signments to variables; possible-can-meet values represent possibilities for future as-
signments. These values can be considered as ‘possibilistic’ because they only exist in
relation to values in some associated, actual CSP. In keeping with ordinary intuitions
about possibilities, the same possible-has-meeting and possible-can-meet value can be
present in the corresponding domains of their respective possibilistic CSPs, i.e. the two
are independent.
To indicate the close semantic relation between these CSPs, which represent pos-
sible values, and the actual CSP of an agent, we call the former “shadow CSPs”. Ap-
propriately, shadow CSPs cannot be said to exist on their own, as can ordinary CSPs.
Moreover, they do not have solutions in the ordinary sense. And in the present case,
there are no real binary constraints. However, they are composed of variables, each
with a domain of values, some of which can be deleted, as shown below. In fact, they
can be described as a tuple
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, just as ordinary CSPs, although in this case
C only includes unary constraints, i.e. constraints on domain inclusion.
The above account suggests that values in shadow CSPs can be considered as ordi-
nary CSP values to which the possibility operator
‘ is attached; for this reason, they
will be termed “modal values”.
As already indicated, in this situation we have two basic kinds of shadow CSPs, re-
lated to existing and future assignments. In addition, there are some other requirements
that we can derive from consideration of the given problem. The most important is that
the set inclusion relation should hold between the corresponding domains of an ac-
tual CSP and any related shadow CSP, where “corresponding” means being associated
with the same variable. In addition, the same relation must hold between correspond-
ing domains of shadow CSPs related to the same actual CSP, here between domains
of possible-cause values and corresponding domains of possible-has-meeting values.
Generalizing from this, we will require that:1. The entire set of shadow CSPs plus the representation of the actual CSP has a
supremum, which we can call the “universal” (shadow) CSP and an inﬁmum which
may be the null set (cf. Fig. 2).
2. For this entire set, the set inclusion relations are reﬂexive and transitive.
3. These relations have an additional property of good-structure in that if a domain
of shadow CSP X is a subset of the corresponding domain of shadow CSP Y, then
another domain of X will be a subset of the corresponding domain of Y.
The ﬁrst two requirements, of course, insure that there is a partial order on each set
of corresponding domains under the set inclusion relation. Requirement three gives a
transitive, reﬂexive relation for the set composed of the entire shadow CSPs. It should
also be noted that these requirements do not preclude the presence of redundant val-
ues within a set of shadow CSPs; there is no notion of partitioning here, and as later
arguments will show this is not, in general, desireable.
Fig.2. Structure of shadow CSP system for the meeting-scheduling problem. Shadow CSPs are
shown as dashed circles. Arrows represent the realization relation holding between the domains
of super- and subordinate CSPs.
In general, the set inclusion relation can be interpreted as a requirement that the
domains of a ‘subordinate’ CSP must be valid “realizations” of the corresponding do-
mains of all of its superordinates. For example, in the present problem a domain in the
CSP that represents possible-causes must be a proper realization of the corresponding
domain of possible-has-meeting’s. As another example, consider a problem where, in-
steadofsimplycommunicatingrejections,agentsspecifythetypeofrejectionbysaying
“rejection-meeting” or “rejection-conﬂict”, by which they mean that they cannot accept
a proposal either because they have a meeting at that time or the proposal conﬂicts with
an existing meeting. This situation could be represented by two possible-cause CSPs,
both of which are proper realizations of possible-has-meetings, but neither of which is
necessarily a realization of the other. (A possible-cause-meeting value might have been
ascertained that is not among the possible-cause-conﬂicts that have been deduced, and
vice versa.)The relation between corresponding elements in an actual CSP and any of its super-
ordinate shadow CSPs is equivalent to the theorem,
￿
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This means that in this case the set inclusion requirement is derivable as a theorem as-
suming that the theses of a standard modal logic hold within this system. This raises the
question of the relation between a shadow CSP system and the systems of modal logic.
Inparticular,whatis therelationbetweenthepresentrepresentation andthewell-known
possible-worlds semantics [3]? With respect to a single domain of size D, clearly there
are
d
>
e possible worlds (PWs) associated with its values. In a shadow system, succes-
sively more inclusive shadow CSPs represent collections of values from successively
more PWs, all of which (in contrast to a PW) are treated as possibilities directly. Hence,
the subset relation holding among corresponding domains in the shadow CSP system
is not equivalent to any accessibility relation in a PW system. It is, therefore, unclear
whether any theses of standard modal logic are excluded. In practice, it has not been
found necessary to go outside the system S1.
4 Making Deductions in the Present Framework
4.1 Allowable inferences
If “modal values” as described above fall within the bounds of a standard modal logic,
then the inferences that we can make must also follow the rules of this system. Since
our real concern here is actual CSP values (i.e. the actual meetings of another agent),
this puts considerable limitations on our ability to carry out inferences in the usual
constraint-based manner. In particular, we would like to be able to carry out something
like the normal arc consistency processing by which we delete values that cannot be
part of any solutions, based on the fact that they are not supported by either the original
domain or the current assignment to an adjacent variable.
For example, in an ordinary CSP, given a constraint between two variables that
prevents values
￿
and
f from appearing together in a solution, from the presence of
￿
we can infer
g
Q
f . (This is an instance ofarc consistency processing,as describedabove.)
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and fromthat
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f . More importantly, under the ordinary rules of our logic if we discover
that a value
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is impossible, we cannot make a deduction based on the implication,
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. Among other unpleasant consequences, this would violate the Law of
Transposition, unless we wanted to assume that
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is equivalent to
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However, we can make a deduction like this if we adopt a closed world assumption.
This is, in fact, what one ordinarily does when representing problems as CSPs, where
the domains in question are considered closed worlds. In this case,
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Under this assumption, therefore, an agent can make deductions from whatever ‘hard’
information it can glean during the scheduling session in order to ‘reﬁne’ domains in
the shadow CSPs.For instance, when another agent makes or accepts a proposal, since we are assum-
ing honest communications, the recipient of this information knows that the other agent
has no meeting in that slot. Therefore, up to ﬁve possible-has-meeting values can be
deleted, since under closed world assumptions
g
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. Moreover, in this case
if
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o
f ; hence, arc consistency based on the original
constraint graph can be used to delete possible-has-meeting values for other variables
(i.e. other cities in nearby time slots).
In addition, for possible has-meetings, it is possible to make inferences back to
actual values. This follows because
g
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. Moreover, if for all cities,
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,
associated with a single time-slot, we have inferred
g
(
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￿
, then we can infer that the
agent has no meeting at that time, i.e. it has an open slot.
The closed world assumption also allows us to infer from a rejection that one
possible-can-meet value is invalid. However, if an actual meeting is given as a reason,
it is possible to remove up to four possible-has-meeting and ﬁve possible-can-meet val-
ues from its time slot, and to delete other possible-can-meet values based on the known
constraints between hard values.
Using arc consistency reasoning, we can also make inferences from rejections to
possible-cause values. From a simple rejection, within the framework of the actual CSP,
we can infer a disjunction of values that might have been responsible for this rejection.
Then, from the rule that
￿
implies
‘
￿
, a set of valid possible-cause values can be
inferred. In addition, since the shadow CSP representing possible causes is subordinate
to that representing possible has-meeting’s, any possible cause values without values in
the corresponding domain of the superordinate shadow CSP can be deleted.
4.2 Rules for deduction
We can summarize the valid inferences relating actual and shadow information by a set
of rules. Theses rules state the conditions for adding or deleting values in the CSP or
shadow CSPs. In all of this it is essential to keep in mind that these rules refer to a view
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These rules fall into two classes, that can be referred to as epistemic and communi-
cation rules. In these rules, a term like
￿
Q
￿
refers to value
￿
in the domain of variable
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i.e. to a speciﬁc meeting. The predicates, “can” and “has” without the possibility opera-
torreferto domain values inan actualCSP; whentheyareprecededbythe operatorthey
refer to the appropriate shadow CSP. In addition, the predicate “cause”, which is always
preceded by the possibility operator refers to another shadow CSP. In addition, we use
the predicates, “reject”, “accept”, “propose”, and “meeting” to refer to the four kinds
of communication we are considering in the present version of a meeting-scheduling
problem. (The last predicate represents the case where an agent explicitly communi-
cates a meeting that it has.) Finally, the sign
p
q is used to designate entailment, while
￿
b
a denotes material implication.
The epistemic rules are:
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Rules E4 and E5 follow from the consistency relations within the actual CSP; they
are expressions of arc consistency pruning. Rule E11 is a thesis of S1. Rules E1-E3 and
E6-E10 express inferences from values of the actual CSP to values in shadow CSPs.
They can be derived from theses in S1, consistency assumptions of CSPs, and/or the
closed world assumption in a straightforward fashion. In addition, the following useful
rules can be derived from Rules E4 and E8 and from E5 and E3, respectively:
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The communication rules are:
Rule C1.
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The rules for the actual addition or deletion of values are also straightforward:
1. If has(
￿
G
￿
) is a consequent of a rule, then if it is negated,
￿
m
￿
can be deleted from the
actual CSP if it exists, and if it is not negated,
￿
i
￿
can be added to this CSP.
2. If a modal value is a consequent, then if it is negated, it can be deleted from the
appropriate shadow CSP if it exists; if it is not negated, it can be added.
The next step is to show that our deductive rules insure that the system of shadow
CSPs is well-structured, in the sense that at any point in the solving process (i.e. after
any set of inferences based on these rules), the system has the properties described in
Section 3.At this point we introduce the notion of system state; this is simply the sets of
domain values in the full shadow system at any step in the solving process. In the initial
state, all domains of the universal shadow CSP as well as possible-has-meeting and
possible-can-meet CSPs have all possible values, while the domains of the possible-
cause shadow CSP and the actual CSPs are empty. Thereafter, the only changes are
the deletion of values from the possible-has-meeting and possible-can-meet shadows or
addition of values to the possible-cause shadow and the actual CSPs.
First we derive two lemmas before we present the basic theorem of good structure.
Lemma 1. If the meeting-scheduling problem is solved using the epistemic and com-
munication rules listed above, then it cannot reach a state where there is a value in
the actual has-meeting CSP without a corresponding value in the possible-has-meeting
shadow CSP.
Proof: A value is added to the actual CSP only if a meeting is communicated (Rule
C4). If the corresponding shadow value had been discarded due to epistemic rule E12,
this would violate the assumption that agent
￿
’s schedule is arc consistent. If the corre-
sponding
‘
]
|
s
￿
}
value were discarded due to epistemic rule E1 or E6, this would reﬂect
an assignment violation. If it were discarded due to rule E2, this would mean that a pro-
posaloracceptancehadbeenmadethatcontradicts themeetingthatwascommunicated.
j
Lemma 2. If the meeting-scheduling problem is solved using the epistemic and com-
munication rules listed above, then it cannot reach a state where there is a value in the
actual can-meet CSP without a corresponding value in the possible-can-meet shadow
CSP.
Proof: If the shadow value corresponding to an actual can-meet value were discarded
via rules E7 or E13, this would mean that there was an existing meeting that was in
conﬂict with the actual can-meet value. If it were discarded due to communication rule
C3, this would also mean that there was a meeting in conﬂict with the actual value.
j
As a preliminary to the main theorem on good structure, it is worth noting the crux
of the proposition is that, since we are only discarding values from the possible-has-
meeting and possible-can-meet shadow CSPs, we must never reach a state where their
domains are not supersets of the corresponding domains in the actual CSP. On the other
hand, since we add values to the possible-cause shadow CSP, then states can be allowed
where there is an actual value without a corresponding possible-cause value; what can-
not be allowed is a state where there is an actual value for which the corresponding
possible-cause value has been ruled out.
Theorem 1. If the meeting-scheduling problem is solved using the epistemic and com-
munication rules listed above, then the shadow CSP system can never reach a state in
which the property of good structure is no longer realizable, i.e. it is not longer possible
to achieve by appropriate additions and deletions to the actual and shadow CSPs.
Proof:Therearethreewaysin whichtheproperties ofgood-structure couldbeviolated:
1. There is an actual value with no corresponding value in a superordinate shadow
CSP.
2. Thereis a shadowCSP valuewithout a correspondingvaluein theuniversalshadow
CSP.
3. There is a possible-cause value with no corresponding possible-has-meeting value.The second case can never happen by virtue of the deﬁnition of the universal shadow
CSP and the fact that no values are ever deleted from it. The third case is prevented by
epistemic Rule E10. The ﬁrst case could happen in either of two ways: (i) we deduce
an actual value for which there is no corresponding modal value in some shadow CSP,
(ii) we deduce that some modal value is impossible, but there is a corresponding actual
value. These cases are ruled out for the possible-has-meeting and possible-can-meet
shadow CSPs by Lemmas 1 and 2. The only way a violation could occur with respect to
the possible-cause shadow CSP is if an actual has-meeting value is added for which the
corresponding possible-cause value is (in some state) deleted. But the latter can only
occur (via Rule E10) if the corresponding value is discarded from the possible-has-
meeting shadow CSP. But this would violate Lemma 1.
j
5 Grounding Possible-Cause Values
In our implementation, we have found that the effectiveness of possible-cause’s could
be greatly enhanced (and further deductions could be realized) if each set of possible-
cause’s associated witha rejectionis maintainedseparately.Thisyields two advantages:
(i) as possible-cause values are discarded,in accordance with Rule E10,instances occur
where the set is reduced to a singleton; in these cases, we can infer an actual meeting
and then make further inferences from that, (ii) after the sets have been appreciably
reduced, they support very effective heuristics in which proposals that conﬂict with
known possible-causes’s are put off temporarily in favor of those that don’t.
In terms of the shadow CSP system, this separation of possible-cause’s amounts to
maintaining a set of shadow CSPs. In this case, however, each CSP represents a sub-
graph of the original network consisting of domains of variables that have constraints
with the variable associated with a rejection. (Note that we cannot consider these as
having all the domains of the actual CSP where some of the domains are degenerate,
because this would violate the property of good structure for the system.) There will, of
course, often be a high degree of redundancy among the values of these shadow CSPs,
but as indicated earlier, this is perfectly acceptable. is perfectly acceptable.
Theorem 2 With this elaboration, the system of shadow CSPs still cannot enter a state
where it can no longer achieve a state in conformance with the property of good struc-
ture.
Proof The same arguments apply as in the proof of Theorem 1, since the elaboration is
simply a redistribution of the same values.
6 Relations to Other Work
Work on modeling agents has considered models that incorporate ideas from modal
logic. However, as far as I know these models have only been concerned with repre-
senting agent behavior in general, so as to demonstrate consistency between beliefs and
goals and similar issues [4]. In fact, there seems to have been little work done on agent
views that corresponds to the present research.
In the CSP ﬁeld, there has been a fair amount of work on “non-standard” CSPs; al-
most all of this has been concerned with “soft constraints”, i.e. constraints or constraintproblems whosesatisfaction is gradedratherthan all-or-none.These problems are mod-
eled by associating constraints or constraint tuples with numerical values, together with
rules for comparing values and combining them [1]. Some of this work, which is con-
cerned with preferences or relative importance among values or constraints, is outside
the concerns of the present work. In other cases, the concern is to represent uncertainty,
either in terms of probabilities or fuzzy measures. In general, this approach appears to
be orthogonal with the present representation.
7 Conclusions
This work introduces a new formalism for dealing with the problem of information
that is not directly available, when this is pertinent to collective problem solving. In
the present paper, we have described the basic framework and identiﬁed properties that
support valid deductions about such information. This system employs concepts from
constraint satisfaction and modal logic in order to reason about information that cannot
be known directly but which belongs to a well-deﬁned universe of values. We have also
describeda set ofdeductions thatsupport the properties ofgood structure in this system.
Based on our initial experience with a system based on these principles, the present
frameworkappears toallowimprovedefﬁciencyofproblem solvinginasituationwhere
this would be not otherwise be possible.
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